Ontological Commitment and Its Implication to Semantical Objects of Religious Language
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Submitted Jan 29, 2023
Published Mar 13, 2023
Published Mar 13, 2023
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This research is aimed at explaining and analyzing the ontological status of semantical objects of religious language. This ontological status concern how every term in religious language refers to an object and how we interpret those terms, whether it represents the object itself or merely its sensual or constructive properties. This finding lies in the disputation between religious realism and non-realism. The results of this research are (1) every believer is exactly a realist because he or she has the ontological commitment to the object of the utterance, but (2) God exists independently from human thought and consciousness, (3) it is possible to put God as the object of intentional and semantic but only represents sensible qualities of the real object, and (4) the meaning of religious language depends on believer's ontological commitment on God's existence.
Keywords: Existence, Ontological Commitment, Ontological Status, Religious Language, Semantic
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How to Cite
Khasri, M. R. K., Syamsuddin, M. M., & Murtiningsih, S. (2023). Ontological Commitment and Its Implication to Semantical Objects of Religious Language. European Journal of Theology and Philosophy, 3(2), 19–29. https://doi.org/10.24018/theology.2023.3.2.96
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